Peer Reviewed Articles:

forthcoming. “Unlimited Nature: A Śaivist Model of Divine Greatness.” Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions: 1-17. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11841-024-01005-1

Abstract: The notion of maximal greatness is arguably part of the very concept of God: something greater than God is not even possible. But how should we understand the idea of maximal greatness? The aim of this paper is to provide a Śaivist answer to this question by analyzing and discussing the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition. First, I extract a model of divine greatness, the Hierarchical Model, from Nagasawa’s work Maximal God. According to the Hierarchical Model, God is that of which nothing could be greater in virtue of being better suited than all other beings with respect to certain attributes known as great-making properties (§1). I then offer an analysis of the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition by discussing passages from the work of Somānanda, the founder of the school, and of Utpaladeva, the most prominent of Somānanda’s disciples, and argue that the Pratyabhijñā theist cannot account for divine greatness in terms of the Hierarchical Model. Briefly, my argument is that the Hierarchical Model requires a comparison between God and other beings that cannot be made with the Pratyabhijñā God (§2). Finally, I develop an alternative and original model, the Unlimited Nature Model, that accounts for God’s maximal greatness in a way that suits Pratyabhijñā’s theism. According to the Unlimited Nature Model, the nature of all ordinary beings is metaphysically limited as a result of realizing only a small portion of the potential of what could be, and God is maximally great because he only has a completely unlimited nature (§3).

2023. “Towards a Buddhist Theism.” Religious Studies 59(4): 762-774. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412522000725

Abstract: My claim in this article is that the thesis that Buddhism has no God, insofar as it is taken to apply to Buddhism universally, is false. I defend this claim by interpreting a central text in East-Asian Buddhism – The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna – through the lenses of perfect being theology (PBT), a research programme in philosophy of religion that attempts to provide a description of God through a two-step process: (1) defining God in terms of maximal greatness; (2) inferring the properties or attributes that God must have in virtue of satisfying the definition. My argument comprises two steps. First, I argue that, since PBT is a method for providing a description of God starting from a definition of God, any text that contains a PBT ipso facto contains a notion of God. Second, I argue through textual evidence that The Awakening articulates a PBT, concluding that it contains a notion of God. Since the method of PBT leaves open what descriptions are to be inferred, my argument allows me to conclude that a text contains a notion of God without previously committing to any particular conception of the divine, which makes it particularly versatile and powerful.

2021. “Ingegneria concettuale.” APHEX 23 (1). Link.

Abstract: Conceptual engineering is a branch of philosophy characterised by a normative approach towards representation. The fundamental assumption of it is that our representational devices can be defective. Conceptual engineering is then the activity consisting of identifying the defects of such devices and putting in place ameliorative strategies. This paper illustrates the fundamental issues for a theory of conceptual engineering: what does this activity consist of? How can we implement it? What mechanisms regulate the formation of representational devices? Can we have an influence over those mechanisms? Moreover, it will be presented an objection to conceptual engineering and various responses to it.

Articles in Progress or Under Review:

The Beauty of Grimacing Xishi: Aesthetic Value and Agency in the Zhuangzi (with Dominic McIver Lopes)

Abstract: This paper offers an interpretation of the theories of aesthetic value and agency in the Zhuangzi 莊子. The first section outlines some key claims of Confucian aesthetics, namely (1) that ideal agents are, in part, ideal aesthetic agents, (2) that there is one ideal of aesthetic value, and (3) that ideal aesthetic agents are those with the competence to access that ideal. The Zhuangzi accepts (1), but it rejects (2) and (3). The second section argues, contra (2), that the Zhuangzi embraces a variety of pluralism about aesthetic value. This pluralism is rooted in some of the text’s broader metaphysical commitments. The third section argues, contra (3), that the Zhuangzi portrays ideal aesthetic agents as those with the competence to access what it calls ‘utmost beauty’, the plural aesthetic values. As this ideal of aesthetic agency is not within the reach of ordinary human beings, the final three sections of the paper argue that the Zhuangzi additionally recommends a modified ideal of aesthetic agency that is within our reach.

Dancing with the Dao: Wuwei and Divine Creativity

Abstract: One type of theistic soteriology sees the ultimate goal of our lives as the union with the divine. An important task for the philosopher of religion is then that of developing plausible models of such a union. This paper aims to propose a Daoist model that centers around the notion of wuwei 無爲 (lit. “no-action”). Wuwei is a state of perfectly efficacious albeit effortless acting that is achieved by means of attaining a particular harmony with the cosmic order. I propose a theistic reading of the Daodejing 道徳經 as interpreted by the Neo-Daoist philosopher Wang Bi 王弼 according to which wuwei is a state of union with God in action. More precisely, I claim that wuwei is a state in which our acting becomes part of the perpetual flow of divine creativity. The paper is divided into two sections. In the first section, I propose a theistic reading of Wang Bi’s commentary on the Daodejing; in the second, I elaborate on that model to provide my interpretation of wuwei as a state of union with God.

The Metaphysics of Creation in the Daodejing

Abstract: In this paper I offer an original interpretation of the Daodejing 道德經 as containing a distinctive account of creation. On my reading, the Daodejing envisions the creation of the cosmos by the Dao (1) as a movement from non-phenomenality to phenomenality, and (2) as a movement from nothingness to existence. I interpret creation as a unique metaphysical operation that explains how (1) and (2) are possible. The paper is organized into two sections. In the first, I introduce the distinctions between non-phenomenality and phenomenality (§1.1) and between nothingness and existence (§1.2) using them to map the distinction between the Dao and the created world. In the second, I begin by noticing that the move from non-phenomenality to phenomenality seems to pose a ‘hard problem of creation’ and explain how the Daodejing addresses it (§2.1). Then, I propose my account of the Daodejing’s metaphysics of creation (§2.2). I conclude with some considerations about the connections between the Daodejing’s view of creation and its soteriology.

Nothingness in the Mind: a Metaphysics of Radical Creativity

Abstract: This paper uses the theory of creation outlined by Wang Bi in his interpretation of the Daodejing to provide our metaphysics of consciousness with tools that make it capable of explaining radical creativity, defined as creativity that transforms the imaginable space of possibilities. According to Wang Bi’s metaphysics, all existences (you) originate in nothingness (wu) through a process by means of which nothingness structures itself. Drawing from this model, I propose to posit nothingness as an aspect of consciousness and argue that doing so provides tools to explain radical creativity as the origination of contents of consciousness from the nothingness aspect. The paper is organized as follows. The first section provides some important distinctions employed in the debate about creativity. The second section turns to interpret passages from Wang Bi’s commentary on the Daodejing, as well as from the main text, to provide a presentation of Wang Bi’s metaphysics of creation. The third section uses such a metaphysical framework to articulate a metaphysics of consciousness and argues that the proposed metaphysics allows for explaining radical creativity. Finally, the fourth section addresses some objections to the proposed account.

Public Philosophy Articles