Some interpreters claim that the Daodejing 道德經 is an atheistic text. This proposition can be contextualized within a broader tendency in the study of Chinese and Asian thought, which is that of denying that supposedly Western categories like “God,” “creation,” and “soteriology” are applicable outside the Western context. This paper makes the case that there is a viable reading of the Daodejing as containing a form of theism. I begin by offering some general methodological considerations about the use of Western categories in the study of Asian thought, criticizing the view that they are not applicable (§ 1). Then, I turn to the issue of whether the Daodejing can be read theistically (§ 2). First, I show that the claim that the Daodejing is not theistic is based on what I argue to be a narrow definition of “God” and introduce a less narrow way of defining the notion based on perfect being theology (§ 2.1). Then, I apply this notion to the Daodejing to show that the text can be read as containing a form of theism (§ 2.2).

This paper provides a reconstruction of the argumentative logic behind the view of ideal agency in the Zhuangzi 莊子. I begin by articulating two principles that describe the reality in which the text understands agents to be acting: (1) Global Transformation—roughly, the view that reality is constantly transforming and (2) Inscrutability of Change—roughly, the view that agents cannot know how reality will change (§1). Then, I analyze the conditions that one’s agency must satisfy to count as an instance of ideal agency. I extract from the text an argument for the principle of Ideal Adaptive Agency—roughly, the claim that one is an ideal agent if and only if they are maximally adaptive (§2). Then, I consider the question of what capacities are involved in the exercise of ideal agency. First, I identify the nonideal agential stance “Deeming Stance” and extract from the text an argument to the conclusion that those who adopt it are not ideal agents (§3). Second, I identify the agential stance “Adaptive Stance” and extract from the text an argument to the conclusion that agents who adopt it are ideal agents (§4).

This paper offers an original interpretation of the Daodejing 道德經 as containing a distinctive account of creation. In my reading, the Daodejing envisions the creation of the cosmos by Dao (1) as a movement from the absence of phenomenal forms to phenomenal forms and (2) as a movement from nothingness to existence. I interpret creation as a unique metaphysical operation that explains how (1) and (2) are possible. The paper is organized into two sections. First, I introduce the distinctions between the lack and presence of phenomenal forms (§1.1) and between nothingness and existence (§1.2), using them to map the distinction between Dao and the created world. Then, I propose my account of the Daodejing’s metaphysics of creation (§2.1) and elaborate on its connection with the previously drawn distinctions while answering a potential objection (§2.2). I conclude with some considerations about the connections between the Daodejing’s view of creation and its soteriology.

This paper offers an interpretation of the theories of aesthetic value and agency in the Zhuangzi 莊子. The first section outlines two claims that articulate an aesthetics that can be found in the Analects: (1) there is a single ideal of aesthetic value, and (2) ideal aesthetic agents are those with the competence to access that ideal. The Zhuangzi rejects both claims. The second section argues, contra (1), that the Zhuangzi embraces a variety of pluralism about aesthetic value. This pluralism is rooted in some of the text’s broader metaphysical commitments. The third section argues, contra (2), that the Zhuangzi portrays ideal aesthetic agents as those with the competence to access what it calls “utmost beauty” (zhimei 至美), the plurality of aesthetic values. As this ideal of aesthetic agency is beyond the reach of ordinary human beings, the concluding section of the paper argues that the Zhuangzi additionally recommends a modified ideal of aesthetic agency that is within our reach.

This paper interprets the Zhuangzi 莊子 in order to offer a novel theory of the creative process. According to this theory, creativity is realized by embodied processes that consist of spontaneously accessing a perspective, where perspectives are in turn defined as ways of representationally constructing reality. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section defines a concept of creativity in terms of novelty and adaptiveness. The second section turns to textual interpretation and argues that the Zhuangzi embraces a form of perspectivism according to which perspectives are ways of constructing reality by representing it. In section three, I utilize this notion of a perspective to formulate the proposed model of creativity. In section four, I offer a review of various strands of empirical evidence for the model in the context of discussing a transformative practice that the text proposes to improve our creative capacities.

The notion of maximal greatness is arguably part of the very concept of God: something greater than God is not even possible. But how should we understand this notion? The aim of this paper is to provide a Śaivist answer to this question by analyzing the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition. First, I extract a model of divine greatness, the Hierarchical Model, from Nagasawa’s work “Maximal God”. According to the Hierarchical Model, God is that than which nothing could be greater by virtue of being better suited than all other beings in relation to certain great-making properties (§1). I then offer an analysis of the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition by discussing passages from the works of Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school, and of Utpaladeva, the most prominent of Somānanda’s disciples. I argue that the Pratyabhijñā theist cannot account for divine greatness in terms of the Hierarchical Model. My argument is that the Hierarchical Model requires a comparison between God and other beings that cannot be made with the Pratyabhijñā God (§2). Finally, I develop an original alternative model, the Unlimited Nature Model, that accounts for God’s maximal greatness in a way that suits Pratyabhijñā’s theism. According to the Unlimited Nature Model, the nature of all ordinary beings is metaphysically limited as a result of realizing only a small portion of the potential of what could be, and God is maximally great because only he has a completely unlimited nature (§3).

My claim in this article is that the thesis that Buddhism has no God, insofar as it is taken to apply to Buddhism universally, is false. I defend this claim by interpreting a central text in East-Asian Buddhism – The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna – through the lenses of perfect being theology (PBT), a research programme in philosophy of religion that attempts to provide a description of God through a two-step process: (1) defining God in terms of maximal greatness; (2) inferring the properties or attributes that God must have in virtue of satisfying the definition. My argument comprises two steps. First, I argue that, since PBT is a method for providing a description of God starting from a definition of God, any text that contains a PBT ipso facto contains a notion of God. Second, I argue through textual evidence that The Awakening articulates a PBT, concluding that it contains a notion of God. Since the method of PBT leaves open what descriptions are to be inferred, my argument allows me to conclude that a text contains a notion of God without previously committing to any particular conception of the divine, which makes it particularly versatile and powerful.